In the fall of 2011, President Obama announced significant policy changes constituting a complete “rebalance” of defense resources and foreign policy interests to the Asia-Pacific region. Also known as the “Pivot to Asia,” these policy changes included intensified regional U.S. involvement in terms of military spending, military presence, foreign policy, and economic policy. During this period of time the United States was withdrawing from Iraq, beginning a similar process in Afghanistan, and the Obama administration hoped to seize the opportunity to focus on more long-term goals. Asia is the world’s most populous area, the fastest growing economic zone, and since 2000, has been the largest source of imports and second-largest export market for the United States. The region has gained a great deal of economic importance in the last two decades, to the benefit of U.S. economic interests and also aiding China to become the second largest economy in the world. It is easy to interpret the policy changes as a response to the threat of Chinese dominance in a region in which the United States has maintained significant and wide-reaching presence for the last 60 years. As China has become a more active and confident player in the region, U.S. interests appear threatened. The elements of the “Pivot” involving military policy increase U.S. presence in the region, sending a clear message of increasingly prioritizing security. Since President Obama announced the new military policy, there have been numerous roadblocks preventing its full implementation; however, it is important to have a basic understanding of the history and context of the new defense policies in order to understand the significance of the attempted military “rebalance.”
Since World War II, American presidents have allocated significant resources to ensure stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region. This has been achieved through stationing a large number of troops in permanent bases across the region. These investments came during the Cold War, when the threat from communist China and the Soviet Union justified the steep costs for upkeep and maintaining permanent regional bases. Since the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the Iraq war, the Pentagon has been focused on the Middle East and issues other than Asia-Pacific regional security. Leaders in the Asia-Pacific complained of feeling neglected by the United States, demonstrating one of the sentiments that spurred the 2011 policy changes. Despite these complaints, President George W. Bush did implement policies meant to increase U.S. focus on the region. For example, his administration increased operations through rotational deployments rather than permanent base station deployments, a policy that the Obama administration has promised to continue with the ‘Pivot to Asia.’
What has changed in the region in the last decade encouraging further interest from the U.S.? Beyond economic and trade priorities, the United States has an interest in maintaining the status quo of the balance of powers in the region. In the last few years, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (P.L.A.N.) has grown significantly. Between 2013 and 2014, China launched the most naval vessels. Today it operates more than 300 vessels altogether. These ships have gone largely towards its coast guard force, making it larger than all other coast guard forces in the region combined. In response to this imbalance, several countries have acquired more vessels for their coast guard forces. The corresponding increase in incidents between the coast guard vessels has heightened tensions and concerned the U.S. Department of Defense. According to a 2015 Department of Defense report, “the security environment is changing, potentially challenging the continued stability in the region.”
Not only has there been a rapid militarization in the region, but also the populations of all Asia-Pacific nations have grown significantly in the last few years. This has expanded demand for natural resources, thereby increasing the tension surrounding the limited natural resources available in the region. This is one of the key factors of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Fishing in the area amounts to ten percent of global production and an estimated 11 billion barrels of oil sit under the surface of the ocean. Territorial disputes, therefore, are based on more than just nationalist rhetoric. Whoever successfully controls the disputed islands gains access to significant natural resources. Perhaps one of the most alarming actions China has made in the last few years is its reclamation work in the South China Sea. The seven island projects it has underway in the region are uncomfortably close to several of the United States’ regional partners. For example, the island called Fiery Cross was once simply a coral reef. Today, it has an area of 200 hectares, with an airstrip and harbor large enough to accommodate all sizes of Chinese ships, as well as potentially submarines. As the Pentagon surveys these conditions and reconsiders its presence in the region, its ability to prioritize security is limited by federal budget concerns and domestic politics.
Currently, the United States has 368,000 military personnel in the Asia-Pacific. The forward presence of U.S. troops is meant to enable the United States to respond to crises across the region quickly and deter aggression from countries like China and North Korea. In Japan alone, the Pentagon stations 50,000 military personnel. Altogether, 200 American ships are stationed in the region. As the Obama administration has emphasized increasing military presence in the region, it has also been constrained by aggressive budget cuts brought on by the so-called “sequestration” in 2013. Parts of the administration’s initial plans have been delayed or put on hold indefinitely. Overall it has added uncertainty to the “rebalance.” That being said, a few key military changes have been prioritized, budgeted for, and begun to be implemented. Since 2011, there have been new deployments of troops and equipment to the region and enhanced military cooperation with partners. This includes supporting massive multilateral military exercises such as Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC). In more concrete terms, the U.S. has increased allocation of naval ships and aircraft to the region from 50 to 60 percent of the Navy’s total force. The U.S. military has also increased cooperation with its partners by creating new rotational deployments and exchange opportunities. These are only a small sample of military changes included in the “rebalance.”
Several analysts have suggested the value of the policy lies largely as a demonstration of the United States’ commitment to its partner countries in the region, increasing the likelihood that they refrain from re-aligning with China. It also upholds the idea that the U.S. will remain an “integral Pacific power,” not so quickly handing this role over to China by continuing to ignore the region. Also important, the rebalance helps partners in the region feel more confident in working to uphold some key U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific, including: security cooperation, trade and investment liberalization, and human rights. When the U.S. demonstrates its commitment to these interests, it eases the burden for individual partner governments upholding them. At the same time China’s economic power has grown, its diplomatic and military power over its neighbors has caused the Obama administration increasing concern. China’s economic and political model is the first viable alternative model to the one presented by the United States. The Obama Administration wants to counter this model by supporting and bolstering partner governments willing to uphold human rights, democratic values, and economic liberalization in opposition to China.
References:
Mark E. Manyin, et. al., “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama administration’s “Rebalancing” Towards Asia,” Congressional Research Service, March 28, 2012, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf
“2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy,” Department of Defense, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF
Dave Merril, “Dynamic Economies Face Off in the South China Sea,” Bloomberg Business, http://www.bloomberg.com/infographics/2014-06-24/economic-dispute-in-the-south-china-sea.html
Howard French, “What’s behind Beijing’s drive to control the South China Sea?” The Guardian, July 28, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/28/whats-behind-beijings-drive-control-south-china-sea-hainan
Chuck Oldham, “Australia and the US Sign a New Force Posture Agreement,” Defense Media Network, August 12, 2014, http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/australia-united-states-sign-new-force-posture-agreement-fpa/
William Kyle, “The US Navy and the Pivot: Less Means Less,” The Diplomat, March 31, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/the-us-navy-and-the-pivot-less-means-less/
