The recent clashes in Israel and Palestine have sparked a debate as to whether the increased violence constitutes a third intifada. The question is an intriguing one; though political figures or activists might label the incidents as such, there is no academic definition of what constitutes an intifada, making a clear delineation difficult. Claims about the beginnings of the third intifada are nothing new; a similar outburst of violence occurred last fall in Jerusalem and the West Bank, with many commentators calling that incident an intifada. Still, there are noticeable differences between the events of this fall and the previous one. While those incidents occurred on the heels of a bloody war in Gaza that summer, these protests erupted with little warning, similar to the surprise of the first and second intifadas as well.

The current spate of violence certainly bears resemblance to the first two intifadas, particularly in terms of its causes. The First Intifada began as Arab States’ attentions were focused on other international issues, relegating the Palestinian question to a side issue. This parallels the political frustration toward their leadership felt by Palestinians today, with a majority of Palestinians expressing disapproval of Mahmoud Abbas and favoring the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. The First Intifada also began without involvement from Palestinian political leadership similar to the current unrest. Moreover, the Second Intifada was sparked by then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount, mirroring the clashes at Al-Aqsa which began this bout of violence.

Yet, there are also crucial differences. Though, intifada translates into “uprising,” many argue random or loosely connected incidences of violence cannot be considered intifadas. The previous two intifadas had objectives. While the first Intifada did not begin with official Palestinian support, the PLO quickly rallied behind the cause and funded it heavily. Contrast this to the present-termed “Lone Wolf” Intifada. It not only lacks political backing; Palestinian leadership also actively denounces the violence while PA security forces breakup Palestinian protests and arrest suspected terrorists. Perhaps the biggest difference, though, is in terms of scale. Both the First and Second Intifadas were characterized by mass participation, whereas protestors in recent weeks have numbered in the hundreds or a few thousand at most.

None of this is to say a third intifada must be a mirror image of the first two. Some argue unofficial leadership could form and guide the protests, or state that current protests would be sufficient to start an intifada were it not for Israel’s unprecedented level of force projection in the West Bank. The quest to determine if the conflict can be called an intifada is more semantic than anything else. Scholars such as Mazin Qumsiyeh have gone as far as to declare several smaller uprisings intifadas as well (making this flare-up the Fourteenth Intifada, in case you were wondering.) What matters more than the terminology is how differences between current resistance and the first two intifadas shed light on division within the Palestinian population, discontent toward Palestinian leadership, economic grievances, and Israeli attitude toward settler violence.