It has been more than a year since a rebellion toppled one of the most credible democracies in Northern Africa. During that year, the actors initially engaged in the battle for domestic supremacy have been pushed aside, sometimes brutally, by international and powerful actors. In an attempt to provide a more updated account of the Malian crisis, this article examines the development of events.
The crisis originally consisted of an independence movement by the Tuaregs, followed by a military rebellion that ousted the existing democratic government. The Tuaregs have demanded independence because they are ethnically, culturally, and geographically distinct from the rest of Mali. Naming themselves MNLA (Liberation Movement of Azawad), the number of Tuareg rebels exploded in early 2012 as experienced Tuareg fighters returned to northern Mali from Libya after the fall of Muammar al-Gaddafi’s regime. Dissatisfied with the government’s response to the rebellion, Captain Amadou Sanogo led a coup d’etat, eventually forcing President Amadou Toumani Touré to resign. Ironically, the temporary vacuum created by the military uprising facilitated a Tuareg takeover in Mali’s major northern cities like Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal.
However, the situation quickly degenerated beyond the boundaries of a civil war. Following a breakdown of relations between the MNLA and other Islamist groups stemming from the Islamists’ strict Sharia rule, forces associated with al-Qaeda replaced the Tuaregs as the dominant rebellion force (Katarina, 2013). Fearful ofthe implications of terrorism in Mali, Western nations such as the United States, France, and the United Kingdom voiced their concern, with France actually commencing military operations in Northern Mali. As of February 2013, the French and the Malian military have occupied Gao, but are burdened with the task of fending off sporadic attacks.
As one can see, the list of stakeholders has changed drastically since the beginning of the conflict. Specifically, a number of foreign actors have entered the equation, with France and the U.S. on one side, and Al-Qaeda related Islamic fundamentalist forces on the other.
The first option would be for the U.S. to implement direct military intervention. Despite incentives for the U.S. to do so, the White House has been adamant on avoiding direct cooperation with a military regime. This stance is based on a commitment to the spread of democracy, since democracy allows for stability and therefore seclusion of radical factors like terrorism. However, the creation of a democratic regime in Mali would require at least some degree of stability, which is a presumption that cannot be taken for granted at this point.Secondly, another international power like the U.K. could join in the intervention. The reason this ranks above U.S. intervention is solely because David Cameron, along with other leaders, was quite vocal about joining the French in the crisis. Nonetheless, there still seems to be fewer incentives for other powers to join. The French can justify their commitment because of their colonial history in Mali, but anybody else would have to argue different justifications, which at least at this moment seem scant.The next possibility is peacekeeping operations by the UNSC, perhaps in junction with peacekeepers of the African Union. This is an option that is actually being considered at the moment. Despite the hype, however, UNSC peacekeeping missions have traditionally (referring back to Rwanda and Sudan) been slow and ineffective, especially in responding to African conflicts.The most likely scenario remains the primarily-French-plus-Mali campaign against the terrorists, with the U.S. providing support. This is also known as maintaining the status quo. Of course, France is not free from controversy with regards to neo-imperialism and domestic pressures against interventionism. This is the probable reason why the French government was so keen on announcing the termination plan for their military operations and nation-building programs in Mali.
Needless to say, the Malian crisis is one that has no easy solutions. Due to the interconnected nature of today’s international society, Mali has become every country’s problem. Will the terrorists be successfully quelled in Mali? Will France be able to adequately extricate itself after the conflict? What changes will this conflict create in international relations regarding terrorism and Al-Qaeda? What kind of developments will change the current dynamic, and more importantly, prompt the U.S. to be more active? There are many questions, however, it is definite that Mali will remain in our news feeds for a long time.
Ford, Dana, Formanek, Ingrid. “U.S. steps up involvement in Mali” CNN. January 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/26/world/africa/mali-unrest.
Godin, Emmanuel, and Tony Chafer. The French Exception. New York: Berghahn, 2005. Print.
Hoije, Katarina. “Islamist rebels gaining ground in Mali, French defense minister says.” CNN. January 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/14/world/africa/mali-military-offensive.
Schweller, Randall L. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer 1994, pp. 72-107.
“Timeline: The Malian Crisis.” FRANCE 24. January 2013. http://www.france24.com/en/20130121-timeline-malian-crisis-france-military-hollande-islamist-militants-aqmi-un-al-qaeda.
“West Africa: ECOWAS Urges UN Aid for Mali Force,” allAfrica.com, January 2013.http://allafrica.com/stories/201301200199.html.
